In February 1976, Chishimba came before the High Court not to overturn his conviction, but to recover firearms that the magistrate had ordered to forfeit the State. He had been convicted, on his own confession, of unlawful possession of Government trophy and fined a K100, with two months’ imprisonment with hard labor in default. After the prosecution applied under section 145(1) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act, the magistrate also ordered the two firearms found in his possession forfeited.
The appeal therefore concerned property rather than guilt. Chishimba’s counsel argued that the Firearms Act gave courts a discretion whether to order forfeiture, while the National Parks and Wildlife Act appeared to make forfeiture mandatory. Moodley J rejected the supposed conflict.
The mandatory character of section 145(1) was subject to an important qualification:
- The prosecutor had to apply for forfeiture. The statute therefore did not cause every qualifying object to disappear automatically upon conviction.
This continuity deserves careful treatment. It would be too simple to say that post-independence wildlife law was merely colonial law under a new flag, because the Zambian government expanded and reshaped conservation policy for its own purposes.
What makes this case worth remembering is the principle behind the story:
- The National Parks and Wildlife Act had made the choice in advance: once the prosecutor applied following a conviction under that Act, forfeiture was mandatory. The appeal was dismissed.
For lawyers, the value of the case is not only the rule it states, but the way the facts make the rule memorable.
For everyone else, it is another reminder that Zambia’s legal history is also Zambia’s social history.
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